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Abstract
Wepresent a practical framework to deploy privacy-preserving
machine learning (PPML) applications in untrusted clouds
based on a trusted execution environment (TEE). Specifically,
we shield unmodified PyTorch ML applications by running
them in Intel® SGX enclaves with encrypted model parame-
ters and encrypted input data to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of these secrets at rest and during runtime. We
use the open-source Graphene library OS with transparent
file encryption and SGX-based remote attestation to mini-
mize porting effort and seamlessly provide file protection
and attestation. Our approach is completely transparent to
the machine learning application: the developer and the end
user do not need to modify the ML application in any way.
1 Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) is increasingly utilized in many real-
world applications. ML algorithms are first trained on mas-
sive amounts of known past data and then deployed to in-
terpret unknown future data, which allows us to forecast
weather, classify images, recommend content, and so on.
As machine learning pervades our daily lives, privacy con-
cerns emerge as one of the key issues about this technol-
ogy. Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning (PPML) protects
privacy of sensitive user data as well as the trained model—
which constitutes the model owner’s Intellectual Property
(IP)—while performing ML tasks using techniques such as
cryptography [12], hardware technologies [5, 9], and differ-
ential privacy [1].
In this work, we focus on protecting the confidentiality
and integrity of the input data when the computation takes
place on an untrusted platform such as a public cloud vir-
tual machine. We also protect the model for cases where the
model owner is concerned about protecting their IP. In gen-
eral, ML workloads have two phases: training and inference.
Both can be viewed as an application that takes inputs and
produces an output. Training applications take a training
dataset as input and produce a trained model. Inference ap-
plications take new data and the trained model as inputs and
produce the result (the prediction). The goal of our work is to
allow these applications to run in an untrusted environment
Figure 1. PPML with Graphene and Intel® SGX.
(like a public cloud), while still ensuring the confidential-
ity and integrity of sensitive input data and the model. It is
essential to protect the confidentiality and integrity in an un-
trusted environment for PPML applications, since otherwise
privacy may be violated by an untrusted 3rd party.
An effective way of achieving this goal is to use hard-
ware enclaves such as the ones provided by the Intel® SGX
technology [4]. SGX enclaves isolate program’s execution to
protect data confidentiality and integrity, and provide a cryp-
tographic proof that the program is correctly initialized and
running on legitimate hardware with the latest patches. By
using an SGX enclave, we can perform ML computations on
a platform owned by an untrusted party without revealing
the actual input data or trained model. Our approach does
not require any changes in the ML application and works in
many different scenarios.
Specifically, we design and implement a system that trans-
parently enforces the confidentiality and integrity of an ML
application (see Figure 1). First, we encrypt all confidential
inputs with a secret key. Then, we rely on SGX’s remote at-
testation (via RA-TLS [3]) to authenticate to a key server and
securely provision a cryptographic key to the SGX enclave.
The unmodified application runs inside the SGX enclave via
the Graphene library OS [2, 6]. Once the application starts,
the inputs are decrypted with the provisioned key, and any
output is stored encrypted with the same key. Since the plain-
text inputs and outputs are only accessible inside the enclave,
the untrusted platform owner or system software (e.g., op-
erating system) cannot steal them. To make encryption and
decryption transparent to the application, we utilize the Pro-
tected File System feature of Graphene. Using Graphene and
its remote attestation with secret provisioning and protected
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file system techniques, we can build a generic framework to
protect the PPML computation seamlessly without changing
the actual PPML application.
Note that the developer does not need to change a single
line of the Python script; Intel® SGX and Graphene relieve
the developer from this burden by transparently protecting
the model, all inputs, and the classification output.
The accompanying tutorial on running the PPML ver-
sion of PyTorch with Graphene can be found in the official
Graphene documentation: https://graphene.readthedocs.io/
en/latest/tutorials/pytorch/index.html.
2 PPML Use Cases
We focus on the scenario where the data owner does not
necessarily trust the platform where the computations will
take place. As a result, the owner has to protect the confi-
dentiality and integrity of all sensitive data. Here are a few
examples of sensitive data:
• Training with private data A streaming company
provides a personalized contents recommendation sys-
tem. The company wants to train its models without
collecting user data directly because the customers do
not want their data to be used for marketing. In this
case, the training ML application may consume user
data to train the model but should not allow the data
to be used for other purposes.
• Inference with proprietary model A company de-
veloped a video editing application with a patented
ML-based object detection feature. The application
runs on the client side, thus the client’s data never
leaves the local computer. However, the company is
worried that the model could be stolen by competitors.
• Inference with private data A company trained a
model that predicts road traffic based on the real-time
GPS information of a few nearby users. The company
wants to provide a map service using this model. How-
ever, collecting real-time location of individuals vio-
lates the privacy law. The company needs to make sure
that the customers’ GPS data will never be disclosed,
but still wants to use this data to predict traffic.
3 Background
The goal of our work is to allow the data owner to selec-
tively encrypt any of the inputs (training data, inference data,
proprietary model) and/or the outputs (classification result),
and to perform the ML computation on a remote platform
while protecting the data from compromised or malicious
privileged software. To achieve this goal, we rely on Intel®
SGX [4] and the Graphene Library OS [2, 6].
3.1 Intel® SGX
Intel® Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is an ISA extension
for Intel® CPUs that provides capabilities to improve the
confidentiality and integrity of sensitive parts of applications.
Whereas the non-sensitive part of an application resides in
untrusted memory and executes as usual, sensitive code and
data are put inside an SGX enclave—a region of memory that
is opaque to all other software including privileged OS/VMM.
The code inside the SGX enclave can execute almost all
CPU instructions and can access data both inside and outside
of enclave. Attempts by any other software to directly access
enclave data from outside of the enclave fail. Intel® SGX
additionally encrypts all enclave data when it leaves the CPU
chip so attempts to mount a hardware attack and directly
read data in RAM or on memory bus also fail.
Additionally, Intel® SGX guarantees that the remote execu-
tion of a program is cryptographically attested and provides
the infrastructure for remote attestation [7]. All manufac-
tured SGXprocessors are listed in theweb servicemaintained
by Intel, called Provisioning Certification Service. Cloud
providers typically register their SGX platforms with this
service and obtain Intel-issued X.509 certificates for these
platforms. These certificates are used to prove that the SGX
processor is genuine and up-to-date.
3.2 Graphene Library OS
Graphene is an open-source library OS that allows an un-
modified ELF binary to run on different platforms, including
Intel® SGX enclaves. It serves as a minimal bootloader and
an emulation layer between the enclavized application and
the underlying host OS. Graphene can be thought of as a
minimal re-implementation of the Linux kernel, striving to
resolve most application requests (in the form of system
calls and opened pseudo-files) inside the SGX enclave and
occasionally resorting to host-OS provided resources (net-
work IO, file system IO, thread scheduling, process creation,
etc.). Graphene additionally implements extensive checks on
system call arguments and return values, helping to protect
against maliciously crafted values.
3.3 Graphene Manifest
The application running inside Graphene must be accompa-
nied by a security manifest (see Figure 2). The manifest is a
simple configuration file that describes the execution envi-
ronment of the enclavized application including its security
posture, environment variables, loaded libraries, arguments,
etc. For example, the manifest specifies the executable to
load and run âĂŞ in our PyTorch PPML case, the Python3
executable. The manifest also specifies a subset of host-OS
directories to be mounted inside the enclave so that only
they are visible to the application (possibly under a different
name). The manifest also contains SGX-specific variables
like the maximum enclave size and the maximum number
of enclave threads. Finally, files to be consumed by the SGX
enclave must be marked as trusted or protected, such that
Graphene can verify that these files were not modified during
run time.
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Figure 2. Graphene manifest file for the enclavized PyTorch
application (only a snippet for readability).
To verify the manifest, properly finalize it and add the
SGX-specific information, Graphene provides the Signer tool
that automatically generates the final manifest from the user-
provided template. This manifest must be shipped together
with the application binaries to the remote SGX platform
in order to start the SGX enclave with Graphene and the
application.
3.4 Secret Provisioning in Graphene
Before the remote user provisions her application to the
untrusted platform, she must gain trust in the Intel® SGX
hardware available on this platform and in the SGX enclave
that runs the PPML application. This is achieved via the
Remote Attestation (RA) infrastructure.
Graphene provides two libraries that transparently add
RA flows to the user application. (1) The RA-TLS library [3]
augments normal SSL/TLS sessions with the SGX-specific
X.509 certificate containing all required measurement infor-
mation on the attested platform and the SGX enclave and
installs an SGX-specific handshake callback to trigger veri-
fication of these measurements at the remote user side. (2)
The Secret Provisioning library builds on top of RA-TLS and
automatically establishes a secure SSL/TLS session between
the SGX enclave and the remote user so that the user may
gain trust in the remote enclave and provision secrets to it
before the application starts.
Typical secrets that the remote user may want to provi-
sion to the SGX enclave include: encryption keys (to encryp-
t/decrypt files, network connections, etc.), user credentials
(usernames, passwords, tokens), command-line arguments
and environment variables, etc.
3.5 Protected Files in Graphene
Graphene implements the Protected File System (Protected
FS) to transparently protect application files. Integrity- or
confidentiality-sensitive files (or whole directories) accessed
by the application must be marked as protected files in the
Graphene manifest. New files created in a protected direc-
tory are automatically treated as protected. The encryption
format used in Protected FS is borrowed from the similar
feature of Intel® SGX SDK [8].
Internally, Protected FS divides the protected file in 4KB
data blocks and bundles them together in aMerkle tree. Some
of the blocks are devoted to Protected FS metadata such
as secure hashes over child blocks, derived keys, integrity-
protected filenames, etc. AES-GCM is used as the underlying
crypto algorithm. As a performance optimization, Protected
FS keeps frequently accessed blocks in an LRU cache.
4 PPML PyTorch Example
This section first describes the threat model and then demon-
strates the PPML workflow shown in Figure 3.
4.1 Threat Model
We consider the implementation of Intel® SGX, Graphene Li-
brary OS, and the ML application to be trusted. On the other
hand, the cloud provider and its system software such as the
operating system or virtual machine monitor are untrusted.
The key manager/secret provider runs on a trusted ma-
chine on-premise of the user. Its operation is trusted to re-
lease cryptographic keys only after the remote attestation
successfully proved the identity of the remote SGX enclave.
An adversary cannot access the trusted machine directly or
via vulnerabilities in the secret provisioning application.
Instead, an adversary has control over the untrusted cloud
machine. By design of Intel® SGX, the adversary cannot
access the memory contents of any enclave. In addition, any
confidential data (such as the secret inputs or ML model) is
stored persistently only in encrypted form, preventing the
attacker from accessing said secrets.
We assume known attacks—including side-channel attacks—
against Intel® SGX [10, 11] to be mitigated in hardware.
4.2 PPMLWorkflow
For our PPML use case, we use the PyTorch example deployed
with Graphene and running inside an Intel® SGX enclave.
We use the preloaded Secret Provisioning library to receive
the cryptographic key for encrypted input and model files.
These files are stored on the untrusted cloud storage and are
transparently decrypted by Protected FS.
Figure 3 shows the complete PPML workflow. To run her
application on a particular SGX platform, the remote user
must first retrieve the corresponding SGX certificate from
the Intel® Provisioning Certification Service, along with Cer-
tificate Revokation Lists (CRLs) and other SGX-identifying
information 1○.
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Figure 3. Complete flow to start PyTorch PPML application on an untrusted platform, remotely attest the platform, provision
the encryption key for protected files, execute the application, and generate the protected output.
As a second preliminary step, the user must encrypt the
input and model files with her cryptographic key and send
these protected files to the cloud storage 2○.
Next, the remote platform starts the PPML application
inside of the SGX enclave. Meanwhile, the user starts the
secret provisioning application on her ownmachine. The two
machines establish a TLS connection using RA-TLS 3○, the
user verifies that the remote platform has a genuine up-to-
date SGX processor and that the application runs in a genuine
SGX enclave 4○, and finally provisions the cryptographic
key to this remote platform 5○. Note that during build time,
Graphene informs the user of the expected measurements
of the SGX application.
After the cryptographic key is provisioned, the remote
platform may start executing the application. Graphene uses
Protected FS to transparently decrypt the input and the
model files using the provisioned key when the PPML ap-
plication starts 6○. The application then proceeds with exe-
cution on plaintext files 7○. When the PPML application is
finished, the output file is encrypted with the same crypto-
graphic key and saved to the cloud provider’s file storage 8○.
At this point, the protected output may be forwarded to the
remote user who will decrypt it and analyze its contents.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a framework for building prac-
tical privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) applica-
tions and deploying them in an untrusted cloud. Our frame-
work relies on the Intel® SGX hardware technology and the
Graphene LibOS software. We highlighted the ease of use of
the framework based on an example PyTorch ML application.
We believe that our framework may be used as a basis for
secure PPML and allows to achieve confidentiality, integrity,
and privacy of user data (conditioned upon the careful imple-
mentation of ML algorithms to preserve privacy) with little
porting and deployment effort.
The accompanying tutorial on running the PPML ver-
sion of PyTorch with Graphene can be found in the official
Graphene documentation: https://graphene.readthedocs.io/
en/latest/tutorials/pytorch/index.html.
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